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Article: 
Question: What do the Department of Homeland Security, Intel, and Disney have in common?
1
 Answer: 
The success of each depends on how  efficiently they implement new technologies.  Although the 
White House and the Congress  have responded swiftly to the events of September  11, 2001, the long-term 
security of our Nation, and thus the success of the newly created Department  of Homeland Security, will 
depend in a substantial way on the efficiency with which technologies  relevant to homeland security are 
created and,  more importantly, deployed. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the Administration‘s revealed understanding of the innovation process, 
which underlies the creation of new homeland security technology, and attendant  factors that relate to the 
efficiency with which the  new technology is deployed. By ―revealed understanding‖ we are referring to the 
written word,  namely what is outlined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and related documents. 
Certainly, the  Act, and related documents from the White  House, are only init ial templates that 
frame  activities to come. But, as the Brookings Institution‘s (2002, p. i) early assessment of the Depart-
ment‘s organizat ion, and the Department‘s  organization is fundamentally related to its ability  to 
provide incentives for the creation and deployment of homeland security technology, ― ... while  it is 
possible to revisit or even reverse organizational decisions at a later stage, it is far better to  get it right the 
first time.‖ 
 
An emphasis on homeland security technology 
On June 6, 2002, President Bush addressed the Nation (Bush, 2002): 
 
So tonight, I ask the Congress to join me in creating a  single, permanent department with an overriding 
and urgent mission: securing the homeland of America,  and protecting the American people. 
 
The Department of Homeland Security will be charged with four primary tasks. The new agency will 
[1] control our borders and prevent terrorists and  explosives from entering our country. It will [2] work 
with state and local authorities to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies. It will [3] bring  
together our best scientists to develop technologies that detect biological, chemical, and nuclear weap-
ons, and to discover the drugs and treatments to best  protect our citizens. And this new department will 
[4] review intelligence and law enforcement information from all agencies of government, and produce 
a single daily picture of threats against our homeland. 
 
One of the first policy institutes to offer an opinion  on homeland security was the Heritage Foundation 
(2002).
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 Its report, Defending the American  Homeland, recommended four well conceived  priorities: 
protecting the Nation‘s infrastructures,  strengthening civil defense, improving intelligence and law 
enforcement, and military operations to  combat terrorism. 
 
The priorit ies int roduced in the Heritage  Foundation document were articulated in one form or another in 
the Administration‘s July 2002  National Strategy for Homeland Security. However, the two independent 
reports differ in one  important respect. Defending the American Homeland ignored the role of technology 
in homeland  security. Its implicit assumption was that new  technologies would simply be available when 
needed to address appropriately the prioritized  national needs. In contrast, National Strategy for  Homeland 
Security explicitly addressed the important role of new technology. 
 
National Strategy for Homeland Security sets forth a foundation for the Homeland Security Act  of 2002, which 
was in draft form at the time of the  report although the Act was not finalized until  November. National 
Strategy for Homeland Security stated (p. 51): 
 
The Nation needs a systematic national effort to  harness science and technology in support of 
homeland security. Our national research enterprise is vast  and complex, with companies, 
universities, research institutes, and government laboratories of all sizes conducting research and 
development on a very broad range of issues.... The private sector has the expertise to develop 
and produce many of the technologies, devices, and systems needed for homeland security. The 
federal government needs to find better ways to harness the energy, ingenuity, and investments 
of private entities for these purposes. 
 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296, was passed on November 25, 2002.  Section 101 
(b) (1) states the mission of the newly created Department is to: 
 
(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
(B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; 
(C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United 
States; 
(D) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting as a focal point 
regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning; 
(E) ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the Department that are not related 
directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of 
Congress; 
(F) ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, 
and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and  
(G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such 
connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking. 
 
The Act elaborates on the technology issues in National Strategy for Homeland Security in several respects, 
emphasizing in particular the terms ―research‖ and ―development.‖ Section 302 gives the Directorate for 
Science and Technology within the Department responsibility for, among other things:3 
 
(4) conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities 
that are relevant to any of all elements of the Department, through both intramural and extramural 
programs ... ; 
(5) establishing priorities for, directing, funding, and conducting national research, development, test and 
evaluation, and procurement of technology and systems for—  
(A) preventing the importation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and related weapons 
and materials; and 
(B) detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks; 
(6) establishing a system for transferring homeland security developments or technologies to Federal, 
State, local government, and private sector entities; 
The Directorate for Science and Technology is  also given the responsibilities for the operation of the 
newly established Homeland Secur it y  Advanced Research Projects Agency—HSARPA (Section 307 
(b) (3)) to:
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(A) support basic and applied homeland security research to promote revolutionary changes in tech-
nologies that would promote homeland security; 
(B) advance the development, testing and evaluation, and deployment of critical homeland security tech-
nologies; and 
(C) accelerate the prototyping and deployment of technologies that would address homeland security 
vulnerabilities. 
 
An emphasis on university-based research, which was explicit in National Strategy for Homeland  Security, is 
also noted in Section 308 (b) (1) of the  Act with reference to the above referenced extramural programs. The 
Secretary, acting through  the Under Secretary for Science and Technology: 
 
... shall operate extramural research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation programs so as 
to— 
(A) ensure that colleges, universities, private research institutes, and companies (and consortia thereof) 
from as many areas of the United States as practical participate; 
(B) ensure that the research funded is of high quality  
. . . ; 
(C) distribute funds through grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts. 
 
Is addition, university-based centers for homeland security will be established to coordinate university-based 
technology activities (Section 308 (b)  (2)). 
 
Sect ion 312 (c) establishes the Homeland  Security Institute, an organizational initiative that was not 
explicit in National Strategy for  Homeland Security. The Institute will be responsible for, among other 
things: 
 
(4) Identification of instances when common standards and protocols could improve the interoperability 
and effective utilization of tools developed for field operators and first responders. 5,6 
 
Innovation, technology, and the entrepreneurial process 
To assess the Administration‘s emphasis on  technology, a model of what we call the entrepreneurial 
process is offered and then the elements of that model are compared to the elements of  technology 
creation and deployment set forth in  the Act. The model is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Briefly, the firm is characterized in the figure as  an entrepreneurial agent of change, or, to reflect  on 
terminology from this history of economic  thought on entrepreneurship, the firm is characterized as 
the economic agent adjust ing to  disequilibria (Hebert and Link, 1988). The firm,  as illustrated by the 
upper horizontal elements in  the figure, optimizes given its strategic focus and  the competitive pressures it 
faces in the market  place, an,d of course,  these two forces are  interrelated although they are shown 
separately  in the figure. Optimization generates an entrepreneurial response, and that purposive action in turn  
results in an innovation. There are addit ional  market forces at work that are, in part, beyond the  influence 
of the firm. These forces determine the  economic value of the innovation and hence, the  value added by the 
firm as well as to the user of the innovation. 
 
Research and development (R&D) activity is  the primary resource that the firm relies upon to  invest igate 
the appropriate strategic/market  response and to act upon it. Enhancing the firm‘s  R&D activity is the 
firm‘s relationship with other organizations as well as with its external environment. One such relationship is 
its involvement with other firms, or perhaps with either a university or a federal laboratory. Such strategic 
associations are frequently referred to as research partnerships.  Also, firms rely on infrastructure 
technologies (e.g. standards and protocols) that come from federal  laboratories, or perhaps even from the 
environment created by being located in a science park.  The science base, which consists of the stock of  
knowledge generated from basic research, resides  in the public domain—and the public domain is  
international in scope—generally in the form of scientific journals but also it is in part embodied in university 
scientists. 
 
 
 
As illustrated, the result of the entrepreneurial process is innovation. An innovation will generate value added 
if it is accepted in the marketplace.  Furthermore, it  will diffuse into society and  generate spillover 
benefits to other firms both within the industry and in outside industries that ultimately use the innovation. 
The dashed arrow coming  back to the science base shows an internal feedback.  Once an innovation exists, 
knowledge has been  created and it too will reside in the public domain. 
 
All of the elements in the model in Figure 1 are touched upon in the Act. There is an explicit  recognition 
in the Act that new homeland security technologies will be needed; that will come from myriad sources 
including firms but also universities and research institutions; and that the effective  deployment of these 
technologies will depend on  the availability of standards and protocols to help  to ensure interoperability. 
Thus, high marks are  given to the Administration for its implicit understanding of the critical elements that 
enhance the innovation process.
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However, two issues remain, and neither issue is addressed in the Act or in subsequent Administration 
white papers.
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 Specifically: What is the  most effective way to organize the Department to  maximize (1) 
the efficiency with which new  technology is created and (2) the speed with which  new technology is 
deployed and then effectively  used for homeland security. The creation of new  technology is common to all 
R&D agencies. The  somewhat unique aspect of the Department of  Homeland Security is the emphasis on 
deployment  for immediate and future use, with a research  strategy to evolve more slowly. One implication 
of this latter emphasis is the need to push technical  infrastructure, and ultimately standards, to support 
deployment. 
 
Some within the Technology Administration of the Department of Commerce have argued that,  from a 
technology creat ion perspect ive, the  Department of Homeland Security should model  itself after the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
10
 We disagree, as discussed in the following 
section. To this point, no  initiatives that have been suggested for how to  increase the speed with which new 
technology is  deployed and then effectively used.   
 
The DARPA model
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On February 7, 1958, by Public Law 85-325 and Department of Defense Directive 5105.15, the  Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA)  was created and charged with the responsibility  ―for the direct ion 
or performance o f such  advanced projects in the field of research and  development as the Secretary 
of Defense shall,  from time to time, designate by individual project  or by category.‖ More specifically, the 
agency was created as a U.S. response to the Soviet launch of  Sputnik. Among ARPA‘s founding principles, its 
activities will be project based, with a 3- to 5-year  time horizon, and with a strong focus on end  goals. 
 
On March 23, 1972, ARPA‘s name was  changed to DARPA, moving the agency under  the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. At that time  its emphasis was on energy, information processing, and tact ical 
technologies. But then on  February 22, 1993, the name was changed back  to ARPA during the Clinton 
administration. On  February 10, 1996, the name was again re-changed  to DARPA under Public Law 104–
106. Throughout the 1990s ARPA/DARPA focused in the areas  of materials science, electronic 
sciences and  systems, informat ion technology, and sensor  technology. 
 
While DARPA has been successful in generating and deployment technologies that it deemed  important, the 
DARPA model is one that is  solicitation based. This means that needed technologies are defined, such 
technologies are specified and solicited, and then DARPA becomes the  market for new technologies. We are 
not critical of this model, in concept, because it seems to have  worked well for DARPA for more than 
four  decades.
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A solicitation-based program assumes that the solicitor can (1) define the needed technical  requirements, 
(2) specify the physical representation of those requirements, and (3) determine  when the technology 
will be needed to meet a  particular need. Unfortunately, none of these three  assumptions apply to homeland 
security technology. 
 
Recommendations for the homeland security institute 
While no initiatives have been put forward to  increase the speed with which new technology is deployed 
and then effectively used, the Act does  set forth an appropriate institutional umbrella to  address this issue. 
The Homeland Security Institute is charged with identifying instances when  common standards and 
protocols could improve  the interoperability and effective utilization of  tools developed for filed 
operators and first  responders. We recommend that the Institute do  more than identify needed 
standards for ―tools developed;‖ we recommend that it take on the role of an information broker. Specifically, 
the Institute could establish effective communications channels through which scientists and engineers 
could  articulate infrastructure needs—standards—that  they expect would be needed to bring to market  
technologies that they think may be relevant to  homeland security, and scientists in our federal  laboratory 
system could publicize the resource  base of their expert ise in various standards  development areas. 
Such a communications role  would have several distinct economic advantages.
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 But, information has 
to be provided to  help these ―actors‖ identify where and how to  apply their comparative advantages. The 
implication is a need for strategic planning, including an  assessment of the ―security industrial base‖ (just as  
the Department of Defense assesses the ―defense industrial base‖). After all, deployment has to  have end 
points and many of these end points are  not pure private markets. 
 
Our recommendat ion would allow all the  relevant players on the homeland security field— scientists and 
engineers in universities, industry,  and federal laboratories—to work in the area of  their comparative 
advantage. It would serve an important public sector objective: to make accessible science-based 
information (as opposed to  creating it). It would enhance market mechanisms  rather than altering or 
replacing them. And finally,  it would reduce the risk of government‘s intervening too much or too little.
14
 
 
Acknowledgments 
Earlier versions of this paper have benefited from the comments and suggestions of Connie Jacobs, Jamie Link, 
John Roberts, Greg Tassey, Eleanor Thomas, and Don Siegel. 
 
Notes: 
1. This introduction format is borrowed from ―Bully for Brontosaurus‖ (Gould, 1991). 
2. The Heritage Foundation Homeland Security Task Force was independently formed shortly after the events 
of September 11. 
3. The directorate will be headed by an Under Secretary for Science and Technology. 
4. The 2003 budget for this agency is authorized at $500 million ―and such sums as may be necessary 
thereafter‖ (Section 307 (c) (2)). 
5. Standards have long been known to be critical to the speed at which new technologies enter the marketplace 
(Link and Tassey, 1988; Link and Kapur, 1994) and then to their effective use. Regarding the latter, ―In 1904, a 
fire broke out in the basement of the John E. Hurst & Company Building in Baltimore [Marylandl. After taking 
hold of the entire structure, it leaped from building to building until it engulfed an 80-block area of the city. To 
help combat the flames, reinforcements from New York, Philadelphia and Washington, DC immediately 
responded—but to no avail. Their fire hoses could not connect to the fire hydrants in Baltimore because they 
did not fit the hydrants in Baltimore. Forced to watch helplessly as the flames spread, the fire destroyed 
approximately 2,500 buildings and burned for more than 30 hours.‖ See: http://www.ansi.org/ 
consumer_affairs/history_standards.aspx?menuid = 5 This Baltimore event was instrumental in the 
formation of the National Bureau of Standards, which later became the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). 
6. The importance of the proposed Institute was emphasized by the National Research Council (2002). 
7. The Brookings Institution offered an organizational criticism of the organization of the Department of 
Homeland Security, noting that the Department‘s narrow focus on chemical, radiological, biological, and 
nuclear countermeasures research ignores the wide contribution that science and technology could make to 
secure the Nation against terrorism. 
8. Section 1003 of the Act makes clear the potential role of the NIST in developing standards for information 
systems, but NIST‘s standards and protocol general expertise could be equally as relevant to many other 
technologies. 
9. Surprisingly, neither of these issues was addressed by the Brookings Institution in their critique of the 
organization of the Department of Homeland Security (2002) or in RAND‘s December 2002 report to the 
President. 
10. Personal correspondence. 
11. Much of the material in this section comes directly from the DARPA Web site: http://www.darpa.mil 
12. In contrast, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (2001) points out that DARPA‘s history of pursuing 
radical innovations and technologies results in them being ―difficult to deliver and to transition‖ (p. x). 
13. This recommendation assumes, of course, that the research sector is not only capable of producing needed 
technologies but also that it is capable of anticipating what technologies will be needed in the future. 
14. There are within the Act resources on call to accomplish my recommendation. Section 308 (c) gives the 
Department authority to create intramural research programs using the resources of, say, the federal laboratory 
system. National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) calls for the establishment of a national laboratory for 
homeland security and my recommendation could become part of that infrastructure‘s mission. 
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